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Abstract. Bellare, Boldyreva, and O'Neill (CRYPTO '07) initiated the
study of deterministic public-key encryption as an alternative in scenarios
where randomized encryption has inherent drawbacks. The resulting line
of research has so far guaranteed security only for adversarially-chosen
plaintext distributions that are independent of the public key used by the
scheme. In most scenarios, however, it is typically not realistic to assume
that adversaries do not take the public key into account when attacking
a scheme.
We show that it is possible to guarantee meaningful security even for
plaintext distributions that depend on the public key. We extend the
previously proposed notions of security, allowing adversaries to adap-
tively choose plaintext distributions after seeing the public key, in an
interactive manner. The only restrictions we make are that: (1) plaintext
distributions are unpredictable (as is essential in deterministic public-key
encryption), and (2) the number of plaintext distributions from which
each adversary is allowed to adaptively choose is upper bounded by 2
p,
where p can be any predetermined polynomial in the security parame-
ter. For example, with p = 0 we capture plaintext distributions that are
independent of the public key, and with p = O(slogs) we capture, in
particular, all plaintext distributions that are samplable by circuits of
size s.
Within our framework we present both constructions in the random-
oracle model based on any public-key encryption scheme, and construc-
tions in the standard model based on lossy trapdoor functions (thus,
based on a variety of number-theoretic assumptions). Previously known
constructions heavily relied on the independence between the plaintext
distributions and the public key for the purposes of randomness extrac-
tion. In our setting, however, randomness extraction becomes signi-
cantly more challenging once the plaintext distributions and the public
key are no longer independent. Our approach is inspired by research on
? Part of the work was done at Microsoft Research Silicon Valley.
?? Part of the work was done while the author was a Postdoctoral Researcher at Mi-
crosoft Research Silicon Valley.2 A. Raghunathan, G. Segev, S. Vadhan
randomness extraction from seed-dependent distributions. Underlying
our approach is a new generalization of a method for such randomness
extraction, originally introduced by Trevisan and Vadhan (FOCS '00)
and Dodis (PhD Thesis, MIT, '00).
1 Introduction
Deterministic public-key encryption was introduced by Bellare, Boldyreva, and
O'Neill [1] as an alternative in scenarios where randomized encryption has in-
herent drawbacks. For example, ciphertexts that are produced by a randomized
encryption algorithm are not length preserving (i.e., may be longer than their
corresponding plaintexts), and are in general not ecient searchable { two prop-
erties that are problematic in many applications involving massive amounts of
data. In addition, the security guarantees provided by randomized public-key
encryption schemes are typically highly dependent on the assumption that fresh
and essentially uniform random bits are available { which may not always be a
valid assumption.
When using a deterministic encryption algorithm, however, the full-edged
notion of semantic security [13] is out of reach. In this light, Bellare et al. ini-
tiated the study of formalizing other strong and meaningful notions of security
for deterministic public-key encryption, and quite a signicant amount of work
has been devoted to proposing various such notions and constructing schemes
satisfying them [1,3,4,2,7,12,15,21]. Aiming to obtain as-strong-as-possible no-
tions of security, this recent line of research has successfully shown that a natural
variant of the notion of semantic security can be guaranteed even when using
a deterministic encryption algorithm, as long as plaintexts are: (1) somewhat
unpredictable, and (2) independent of the public key used by the scheme.
Plaintext unpredictability. When using a deterministic encryption algorithm,
essentially no meaningful notion of security can be satised when plaintexts are
distributed over a small (e.g. polynomial-sized) set. In such a case, an adversary
who is given a public key pk and an encryption c of some plaintext m under
the public key pk can simply encrypt all possible plaintexts,3 compare each of
them to the given ciphertext c, and thus recover the plaintext m. Therefore,
when formalizing a notion of security for deterministic public-key encryption, it
is indeed essential to focus on security for unpredictable plaintext distributions.4
Key-independent plaintext distributions. Even when dealing with highly
unpredictable plaintext distributions, some restrictions should be made on their
relation to the public key. Consider, for example, the uniform distribution over
plaintexts m subject to the restriction that the rst bit of m and the rst bit of
3 More generally, an adversary can encrypt all plaintexts that occurs with at least
some non-negligible probability.
4 Unpredictable plaintext distributions do occur in some natural roles. A prime exam-
ple is when using a public-key encryption scheme as a key-encapsulation mechanism
that encrypts a uniformly distributed key k for a symmetric-key primitive.DPKE for Adaptively Chosen Plaintext Distributions 3
c = Encpk(m) are equal.5 More generally, by constructing plaintext distributions
that depends on the public key, adversaries can use any deterministic encryption
algorithm as a subliminal channel that leaks much more information on the
plaintexts than what any meaningful notion of security should allow.
This paper. For preventing adversaries from exploiting deterministic encryp-
tion algorithms as subliminal channels, research on deterministic public-key en-
cryption has so far guaranteed security only for plaintexts distributions that are
independent of the public key used by the scheme (which is not realistic, as an
adversary can often inuence the plaintext distribution after seeing the public
key). In this paper, we ask whether or not this is essential. Namely, is it possible
to formalize a meaningful notion of security that allows dependencies between
plaintext distributions and keys.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we show that it is not essential to focus only on plaintexts distri-
butions that are independent of the keys used by the scheme. We formalize and
realize a new notion of security for deterministic public-key encryption, allowing
adversaries to adaptively choose plaintext distributions after seeing the public
key of the scheme, in an interactive manner. The only restriction we make is
that the number of plaintext distributions from which each adversary is allowed
to adaptively choose is upper bounded by 2p(), where p() can be any prede-
termined polynomial in the security parameter . We stress that the set of 2p()
plaintext distributions can be dierent for each adversary. Intuitively, this bound
says that the entire plaintext distribution (not just a single sample) contains at
most p() bits of information about the public key. We view this as a natural
rst model for adaptively chosen plaintext distributions, particularly in light of
the impossibility of handling arbitrary dependencies (as sketched earlier), and
hope that it will pave the way for more realistic models.
Our approach is a generalization of the security notions that have been pro-
posed so far. For example, with p()  0 we obtain the notion of security in-
troduced by Bellare, Boldyreva, and O'Neill [1], where the plaintext distribu-
tion chosen by the adversary is independent of the public key. As an additional
example, with p() = O(s()logs()) we capture, in particular, all plaintext
distributions that are samplable by boolean circuits of size at most s().
Within our framework we present both generic constructions in the random-
oracle model based on any public-key encryption scheme, and generic construc-
tions in the standard model based on lossy trapdoor functions. Our construc-
tions are inspired by the constructions of Bellare, Boldyreva, and O'Neill [1]
and of Boldyreva, Fehr, and O'Neill [4]. These constructions rely on the inde-
pendence between the plaintext distributions and the keys for the purposes of
extracting randomness from the plaintext distributions. Randomness extraction
becomes signicantly more dicult once the plaintexts distributions and the
5 Note that the support of this distribution will contain nearly half of all plaintexts
with high probability.4 A. Raghunathan, G. Segev, S. Vadhan
public keys are no longer independent. Challenges along somewhat similar lines
arise in the context of deterministic randomness extraction, where one would
like to construct seedless randomness extractors, or seeded randomness extrac-
tors for seed-dependent distributions. Indeed, underlying our approach is a new
generalization of a method for deterministic extraction, originally introduced by
Trevisan and Vadhan [18] and Dodis [9].
Finally, our approach naturally extends to the setting of \hedged" public-
key encryption schemes, introduced by Bellare et al. [2]. In this setting, one
would like to construct randomized schemes that are semantically secure in the
standard sense, and maintain a meaningful and realistic notion of security even
when \corrupt" randomness is used by the encryption algorithm. Our notions
of adaptive security for deterministic public-key encryption give rise to anal-
ogous notions for hedged public-key encryption, and our constructions (when
used within the framework of Bellare et al. [2]6) yield the rst adaptively-secure
hedged public-key encryption schemes.
1.2 Related Work
The formal study of deterministic public-key encryption was initiated by Bel-
lare, Boldyreva, and O'Neill [1], following research on symmetric-key encryption
of high-entropy messages by Russell and Wang [17] and Dodis and Smith [10].
Bellare et al. formalized several notions of security, which were later rened and
extended by Bellare, Fischlin, O'Neill, and Ristenpart [3], and by Boldyreva,
Fehr, and O'Neill [4]. Bellare, Boldyreva, and O'Neill presented constructions in
the random oracle model, and constructions in the standard model were rst pre-
sented by Bellare, Boldyreva, and O'Neill, and additionally by Boldyreva, Fehr,
and O'Neill. Brakerski and Segev [7] showed that the min-entropy requirement
considered in all previous works on deterministic public-key encryption can be
relaxed to consider hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. Based on specic number-
theoretic assumptions, they designed schemes that are secure in the more general
auxiliary-input model, and their constructions were later unied by Wee [21].
Progress along similar lines was made by Fuller, O'Neill and Reyzin [12], who
presented a scheme that can securely encrypt a small predetermined number
of plaintexts with arbitrary dependencies as long as each has high min-entropy.
Additional progress in studying deterministic public-key encryption schemes was
recently made by Mironov, Pandey, Reingold, and Segev [15] who constructed
such schemes with optimal incrementality.
A step towards obtaining adaptive security for deterministic public-key en-
cryption was made by Bellare et al. [2] who dened and constructed \hedged"
public-key encryption schemes (discussed in Section 1.1). Whereas the notions of
security considered in [1,3,4,7,21,12,15] capture only \single-shot" adversaries
(i.e., adversaries that challenge the given scheme with only one plaintext distri-
bution), Bellare et al. [2] showed that it is possible to guarantee security even
6 For example, as part of their generic \pad-then-deterministic" scheme, which deter-
ministically encrypts the concatenation of the plaintext and the randomness.DPKE for Adaptively Chosen Plaintext Distributions 5
against \multi-shot" adversaries (i.e., adversaries that interactively challenge the
scheme with plaintext distributions depending on previous ciphertexts that they
received). In their notion of security, however, adversaries are not given access to
the public key that is being attacked. In our work we consider the more general,
and more typical, scenario where adversaries are given direct access to the pub-
lic key being attacked (and are allowed to adaptively and interactively choose
plaintext distributions depending on previous ciphertexts that they received).7
As discussed in Section 1.1, our constructions yield the rst adaptively-secure
hedged public-key encryption schemes.
1.3 Overview of Our Approach
In this section we provide a high-level overview of our notions of security and
of the main ideas underlying our constructions. We focus here on our construc-
tions in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles), as these emphasize
more clearly the main challenges in designing encryption schemes satisfying our
notions of security.
Our notions of security. As discussed above, our notions of security for deter-
ministic public-key encryption dier from the previously proposed ones by pro-
viding adversaries with direct access to the public key. Specically, we formalize
security via a game between an adversary and a \real-or-random" encryption
oracle. First, a pair containing a public key and a secret key is produced using
the key-generation algorithm of the scheme under consideration, and the ad-
versary is given the public key. Then, the adversary adaptively interacts with
the encryption oracle, where each query consists of a description of a plaintext
distribution M. For simplicity, here we consider distributions over plaintexts,
but in fact our notion allows distributions over blocks of plaintexts. The encryp-
tion oracle operates in one of two modes, \real" or \random", which is chosen
uniformly at random at the beginning of the game. In the \real" mode, the en-
cryption oracle samples a plaintext according to M, and the adversary is given
its encryption under the public key. In the \random" mode, the encryption or-
acle samples a plaintext from the uniform distribution over the plaintext space,
and the adversary is again given its encryption under the public key.8
The goal of the adversary in this game is to distinguish between the \real"
mode and \random" mode with a non-negligible probability, subject only to the
7 In fact, the approach of Bellare et al. [2] relies on encryption schemes in which cipher-
texts reveal essentially no information on the corresponding public key. Therefore,
even multi-shot adversaries learn essentially no information on the public key being
attacked, and thus their \adaptive" choices of plaintext distributions are still inde-
pendent of the public key. This approach does not seem to extend to our setting,
where adversaries are given direct access to the public key.
8 We note that the resulting notion of security is polynomially equivalent (via a stan-
dard hybrid argument) to an analogous \left" or \right" formulation in which the
adversary species two plaintext distributions, and the encryption oracle uses either
the left one of the right one.6 A. Raghunathan, G. Segev, S. Vadhan
requirement that for any such adversary there exists a set X = X of plaintext
distributions such that:
1. jXj  2p, where p = p() is any predetermined polynomial in the security
parameter (the construction of the scheme can depend on the polynomial p).
2. The adversary queries the encryption oracle only with plaintext distributions
in X.
3. Each plaintext distribution in X has min-entropy at least k, where k = k()
is a predetermined function of the security parameter.
In addition, we naturally extend the above game to capture chosen-ciphertext
attacks, by allowing adversaries adaptive access to a decryption oracle (subject
to the standard requirement of not querying the decryption oracle with any
ciphertext that was produced by the encryption oracle).
We note that our security game is in fact almost identical to the standard
\real-or-random" one for randomized public-key encryption. Specically, unlike
the previously proposed notions of security for deterministic public-key encryp-
tion, we provide the adversary with direct access to the public key, and allow
the adversary to adaptively interact with the encryption and decryption oracles
in any order.9
Chosen-plaintext security in the standard model. The starting point for
our construction is the one of Boldyreva, Fehr, and O'Neill, which we now briey
describe. In their construction, the public key consists of a function f that is
sampled from the injective mode of a collection of lossy trapdoor functions, and
a permutation  sampled from a pairwise-independent collection of permuta-
tions. (We refer the reader to Section 2 for the relevant denitions.) The secret
key consists of the trapdoor for inverting f. (We require that  is eciently
invertible.) The encryption of a message m is dened as Encpk(m) = f((m)),
and decryption is naturally dened.
The proof of security consists of two steps. First, the security of the collec-
tion of lossy trapdoor functions allows one to replace the injective function f
with a lossy function e f (where lossy means that the size of e f's image is signif-
icantly smaller than the size of its domain). Then, the Crooked Leftover Hash
Lemma of Dodis and Smith [10] states that for any plaintext distribution M that
has a certain amount of min-entropy, for a uniformly and independently chosen
pairwise-independent permutation  it holds that the distributions e f((M)) and
e f(U) are statistically close (even given e f and ), where U is the uniform dis-
tribution over plaintexts. That is, essentially no information on the plaintext is
revealed.
This construction, however, becomes insecure when adversaries can choose
the plaintext distribution M after receiving the description of . Specically, the
Crooked Leftover Hash Lemma no longer holds when M may depend on , and
9 In contrast, due to requiring key-independent plaintext distributions, Bellare et al. [1]
and Boldyreva et al. [4] allow chosen-ciphertext adversaries to query the decryption
oracle only after they have queried the encryption oracle.DPKE for Adaptively Chosen Plaintext Distributions 7
adversaries may easily use the encryption algorithm as a subliminal channel for
leaking information about the plaintext, as discussed above.
The main idea underlying our basic construction is to sample the permu-
tation  from a collection of highly-independent permutations. We prove that
this modication results in a scheme that is secure according to our new no-
tion of security by proving a High-Moment Crooked Leftover Hash Lemma.10
Informally, we prove that for any lossy function e f, and for any set X of sources
with a certain amount of min-entropy, with an overwhelming probability over
the choice of a permutation  from a t-wise almost-independent collection of
permutations (where t depends only logarithmically on the size of X), for every
M 2 X it holds that e f((M)) and e f(U) are statistically close. In particular,
in such a setting the specic choice of M 2 X can adaptively depend on the
permutation , and still the statistical distance is negligible.
Chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model. While in the setting
of chosen-plaintext security our construction is a natural generalization of that
of Boldyreva et al. [4] (given our high-moment generalization of the crooked
leftover hash), this is not the case in the setting of chosen-ciphertext security.
In this setting, the CCA-secure scheme of Boldyreva et al. relies more strongly
on the assumption that the challenge plaintext distribution is independent of
the public key of the scheme (not just in the context of the Crooked Leftover
Hash Lemma as above) { an assumption that we do not make. Nevertheless, we
show that some of the ideas underlying their approach can still be utilized to
construct a scheme that is secure according to our notion of security.
The scheme of Boldyreva et al. follows the \all-but-one" simulation paradigm
of Peikert and Waters [16] using all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions. These are
tag-based functions, where one of the tags corresponds to a lossy function, and
all other tags correspond to injective functions. As in the work of Peikert and
Waters [16], the approach of Boldyreva et al. makes sure that the challenge
plaintext corresponds to a lossy tag (and thus the challenge ciphertext reveals
no information), while all other plaintexts corresponds to injective tags (and
a suitable simulator is able to properly simulate the decryption oracle). When
dealing with a deterministic encryption algorithm, note that tags must be de-
rived deterministically from the plaintext and the public key. The approach of
Boldyreva et al. is based on rst sampling the challenge plaintext m, and only
then generating a public key for which m corresponds to a lossy tag, but all
other plaintexts correspond to injective tags.
This approach fails in our setting, where adversaries specify the distribution
of the challenge plaintext in an adaptive manner as a function of the public
10 As already noted, a high-moment generalization of the (standard) Leftover Hash
Lemma was given by Trevisan and Vadhan [18] and Dodis [9], but no analogous gen-
eralization was known for the crooked leftover hash lemma. A dierent high-moment
generalization of the crooked leftover hash lemma was proved by Fuller et al. [12] for
the purpose of extracting randomness from a small number of possibly correlated
sources. However, their generalization does not allow seed-dependent sources, and
therefore allows only non-adaptive adversaries.8 A. Raghunathan, G. Segev, S. Vadhan
key. Thus, in our setting we must be able to generate a public key before the
challenge plaintext is known. We note that a somewhat similar issue arises in
the setting of identity-based encryption (IBE): \selective security" considers ad-
versaries that specify the challenge identity in advance, whereas \full security"
considers adversaries that can adaptively choose the challenge identity. One sim-
ple solution that was proposed in the IBE setting is to a-priori guess the challenge
identity, and this solution naturally extends to our setting by guessing the tag
corresponds to the challenge plaintext. This, however, requires sub-exponential
hardness assumptions, which we aim to avoid.
Our approach is based on the one of Boneh and Boyen [5] (and on its re-
nement by Cash, Hofheinz, Kiltz, and Peikert [8] for converting a large class
of selectively-secure IBE schemes to fully-secure ones,11 combined with the idea
of R-lossiness due to Boyle, Segev, and Wichs [6]. Specically, we derive tags
from plaintexts using an admissible hash functions [5,8], and instead of using
all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions, we introduce the notion of R-lossy trapdoor
functions (which we generically construct based on lossy trapdoor functions).12
This is a generalization of the notion of all-but-one lossy trapdoor functions,
where the set of tags is partitioned into lossy tags and injective tags accord-
ing to the relation R. (In particular, there may be more than one lossy tag.)
Combined with an admissible hash function, we are able to ensure that even
with an adaptive adversary, with some non-negligible probability, the challenge
plaintext corresponds to a lossy tag (and thus the challenge ciphertext reveals
no information), while all other plaintexts corresponds to injective tags (and a
suitable simulator is able to properly simulate the decryption oracle). We show
that such a guarantee enables us to prove the security of our scheme with respect
to adaptive adversaries.
1.4 Paper Organization
GIL: To be written.
2 Preliminaries
GIL: Need to lter out anything that will not be used (probably
Lemma 2.1 and subsection on admissible hash functions).
For an integer n 2 N we denote by [n] the set f1;:::;ng, and by Un the
uniform distribution over the set f0;1gn. For a random variable X we denote by
x   X the process of sampling a value x according to the distribution of X and
by E[X] the expectation of the random variable X. Similarly, for a nite set S
11 We note that the work of Cash et al. [8] is based on ideas introduced by Boneh and
Boyen [5] and Waters [20].
12 Boyle, Segev and Wichs [6] introduced the notion of R-lossy public-key encryption,
which can be viewed as a randomized variant of our notion of R-lossy trapdoor
functions.DPKE for Adaptively Chosen Plaintext Distributions 9
we denote by x   S the process of sampling a value x according to the uniform
distribution over S. We denote by X = (X1;:::;XT) a joint distribution of T
random variables, and by x = (x1;:::;xT) a sample drawn from X. For two bit-
strings x and y we denote by xky their concatenation. A non-negative function
f : N ! R is negligible if it vanishes faster than any inverse polynomial.
In this paper we consider the uniform adversarial model (i.e. consider uni-
form probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries). We note that all of our results
also apply to the nonuniform adversarial model (under nonuniform complexity
assumptions).
The min-entropy of a random variable X is H1(X) =  log(maxx Pr[X = x]).
A k-source is a random variable X with H1(X)  k. A (T;k)-source is a ran-
dom variable X = (X1;:::;XT) where each Xi is a k-source for every i 2 [T].
A (T;k)-block source is a random variable X = (X1;:::;XT) where for every
i 2 [T] and x1;:::;xi 1 it holds that H1(XijX1 = x1;:::;Xi 1 = xi 1)  k.
The following standard lemma states that conditioning on random variable
that obtains at most 2v values can reduce the min-entropy of any other random
variable by essentially at most v.
Lemma 2.1 (cf. [19, Lemma 6.30]). Let (Z;X) be any two jointly distributed
random variables such that jSupp(Z)j  2v. Then, for any  > 0 it holds that
Pr
z Z
[H1(XjZ = z)  H1(X)   v   log(1=)]  1   :
The statistical distance between two random variables X and Y over a nite
domain 
 is SD(X;Y ) = 1
2
P
!2
 jPr[X = !]   Pr[Y = !]j. Two random vari-
ables X and Y are -close if SD(X;Y )  . Two distribution ensembles fXg2N
and fYg2N are statistically indistinguishable if it holds that SD(X;Y) is neg-
ligible in . They are computationally indistinguishable if for every probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A it holds that

 
 Pr
x X

A(1;x) = 1

  Pr
y Y

A(1;y) = 1


 

is negligible in .
2.1 t-Wise -Dependent Permutations
A collection  of permutations over f0;1gn is t-wise -dependent if for any dis-
tinct x1;:::;xt 2 f0;1gn the distribution ((x1);:::;(xt)) where  is sampled
from  is -close in statistical distance to the distribution ((x1);:::;(xt))
where  is a truly random permutation. For our construction in the standard
model we rely on an explicit construction of such a collection due to Kaplan,
Naor, and Reingold [14] that enjoys an asymptotically optimal description length
(although we note that in fact any other construction can be used):
Theorem 2.2 ([14]). For any integers n and t  2n, and for any 0 <  < 1,
there exists an explicit t-wise -dependent collection  of permutations over
f0;1gn where each permutation  2  can be described using O(nt + log(1=))
bits, and is computable and invertible in time polynomial in n, t and log(1=).10 A. Raghunathan, G. Segev, S. Vadhan
2.2 Admissible Hash Functions
The concept of an admissible hash function was rst dened by Boneh and Boyen
[5] to convert a large class of selectively-secure identity-based encryption scheme
into a fully-secure ones. In this paper we use such hash functions in a somewhat
similar way as part of our construction of a CCA-secure deterministic public-key
encryption scheme. The main idea of an admissible hash function is that it allows
the reduction in the proof of security to secretly partition the message space
into two subsets, which we will label as \lossy tags" and \injective tags," such
that there is a noticeable probability that all of the messages in the adversary's
decryption queries will correspond to injective tags, but the challenge ciphertext
will correspond to a lossy tag. This is useful if the simulator can eciently answer
decryption queries with injective tags, while a challenge ciphertext with a lossy
tag reveals essentially no information on the encrypted message. Our exposition
and denition of admissible hash function follows that of Cash, Hofheinz, Kiltz,
and Peikert [8].
For K 2 f0;1;?gv(), we dene the \partitioning" function PK : f0;1gv() !
fLossy;Injg which partitions the space f0;1gv() of tags in the following way:
PK(y) :=

Lossy if 8 i 2 f1;:::;v()g : Ki = yi or Ki = ?
Inj otherwise
For any u = u() < v(), we let Ku; denote the uniform distribution over
f0;1;?gv() conditioned on exactly u positions having ? values. (Note, if K is
chosen from Ku;, then the map PK() denes exactly 2u values as Lossy.) We
would like to pick a distribution Ku; for choosing K so that, there is a noticeable
probability for every set of tags y0;:::;yq, of y0 being classied as \lossy" and
all other tags \injective." Unfortunately, this cannot happen if we allow all tags.
Instead, we will need to rely on a special hash function the maps messages x to
tags y.
Denition 2.3 (Admissible hash functions [5,8]). Let H = fHg2N be
a hash-function ensemble, where each h 2 H is a polynomial-time computable
function h : f0;1gn() ! f0;1gv(). We say that H is an admissible hash-
function ensemble if for every h 2 H there exists a eciently recognizable set
Unlikelyh 
S
q2N
 
f0;1gn()q
of string-tuples such that the following two prop-
erties hold:
{ For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A there exists a negligible
function () satisfying
Pr[(x0;:::;xq) 2 Unlikelyh]  ();
where h   H and (x0;:::;xq)   A(1;h).
{ For every polynomial q = q() there is a polynomial  = () and an e-
ciently computable u = u() such that, for every h 2 H and (x0;:::;xq) 62
Unlikelyh with x0 62 fx1;:::;xqg we have:
Pr
K Ku;
[PK(h(x0)) = Lossy ^ PK(h(x1)) =  = PK(h(xq)) = Inj ] 
1
()
:DPKE for Adaptively Chosen Plaintext Distributions 11
The work of Boneh and Boyen [5] shows how to construct admissible hash
functions from collision-resistant hash functions.
2.3 Lossy Trapdoor Functions
A collection of lossy trapdoor functions [16] consists of two families of functions.
Functions in one family are injective and can be eciently inverted using a trap-
door. Functions in the other family are \lossy," which means that the size of their
image is signicantly smaller than the size of their domain. The only security
requirement is that a description of a randomly chosen function from the family
of injective functions is computationally indistinguishable from a description of
a randomly chosen function from the family of lossy functions.
Denition 2.4 (Lossy trapdoor functions [16,11]). Let n : N ! N and
` : N ! N be non-negative functions, and for any  2 N let n = n() and ` =
`(). A collection of (n;`)-lossy trapdoor functions is a 4-tuple of probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms (Gen0;Gen1;F;F 1) such that:
1. Sampling a lossy function: Gen0(1) outputs a function index  2 f0;1g.
2. Sampling an injective function: Gen1(1) outputs a pair (;) 2 f0;1g
f0;1g, where  is a function index and  is a trapdoor.
3. Evaluation: Let n = n() and ` = `(). Then, for every function index 
produced by either Gen0 or Gen1, the algorithm F(;) computes a function
f : f0;1gn ! f0;1g with one of the two following properties:
{ Lossy: If  is produced by Gen0, then the image of f has size at most
2n `.
{ Injective: If  is produced by Gen1, then the function f is injective.
4. Inversion of injective functions: For every pair (;) produced by Gen1
and every x 2 f0;1gn, we have F 1(;F(;x)) = x.
5. Security: The two ensembles

 :    Gen0(1)
	
2N and

 : (;)   Gen1(1)
	
2N
are computationally indistinguishable.
Constructions of lossy trapdoor functions were proposed based on a wide
variety of number-theoretic assumptions and for a large range of parameters
(see, for example, [11,16] and the references therein). In particular, in terms of
parameters, several constructions are known to oer ` = n   n for any xed
constant 0 <  < 1 with n = poly().
2.4 Deterministic Public-Key Encryption
A deterministic public-key encryption scheme is a triplet  = (KeyGen;Enc;Dec)
of polynomial-time algorithms with the following properties:
{ The key-generation algorithm KeyGen is a randomized algorithm that takes
as input the security parameter 1 and outputs a key pair (sk;pk) consisting
of a secret key sk and a public key pk.12 A. Raghunathan, G. Segev, S. Vadhan
{ The encryption algorithm Enc is a deterministic algorithm that takes as
input a public key pk and a message m 2 f0;1gn(), and outputs a ciphertext
c = Encpk(m).
{ The decryption algorithm is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes as
input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c and outputs a message m   Decsk(c)
such that m 2 f0;1gn() [ f?g.
3 Formalizing Adaptive Security for Deterministic
Public-Key Encryption
In this section we present a framework for modeling the security of deterministic
public-key encryption schemes in an adaptive setting. As discussed in Section
1.3, we consider adversaries that adaptively choose plaintext distributions after
seeing the public key of the scheme, in an interactive manner. The only restriction
we make is that the number of plaintext distributions from which each adversary
is allowed to choose is upper bounded by 2p(), where p() can be any a-priori
given polynomial in the security parameter . The security denitions that follow
are parameterized by three parameters:
{ p = p() denoting the 2p bound on the number of allowed plaintext distri-
butions.
{ T = T() denoting the number of blocks in each plaintext distribution.
{ k = k() denoting the min-entropy requirement.
Additionally, they are implicitly parameterized by bit-length n = n() of plain-
texts. We begin by dening the \real-or-random" encryption oracle which we
use formalize security.
Denition 3.1 (Real-or-random encryption oracle). The real-or-random
oracle RoR takes as input triplets of the form (mode;pk;M), where mode 2
freal;randg, pk is a public key, and M = (M1;:::;MT) is a circuit repre-
senting a joint distribution over T messages. If mode = real then the oracle
samples (m1;:::;mT)   M, and if mode = rand then the oracle samples
(m1;:::;mT)   UT where U is the uniform distribution over the appropriate
message space. It then outputs the vector of ciphertexts (Encpk(m1);:::;Encpk(mT)).
Following [1,4] we consider two classes of adversarially-chosen message dis-
tributions M = (M1;:::;MT): The class of (T;k)-sources, where each Mi is
assumed to be a k-source, and the more restrictive class of (T;k)-block-sources,
where each Mi is assumed to be a k-source even given M1;:::;Mi 1. (See Section
2 for formal denitions.) Our constructions in the random oracle model are se-
cure with respect to (T;k)-sources, and our constructions in the standard model
are secure with respect to (T;k)-block-sources. This gap was recently shown by
Wichs [22] to be inherent to our techniques, and in fact to all the techniques
that were so far used for designing deterministic public-key encryption schemes
without random oracles [3,4,2,7,12,15,21]. Speci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deterministic public-key encryption scheme can be proven secure for all (T;k)-
sources using a black-box reduction to a \falsiable" hardness assumption. (We
refer the reader to [22] for more details on his notion of falsiability.)
The following two denitions capture the class of chosen-plaintext adversaries
and security game that we consider in this paper. We refer the reader to the full
version [?] for their natural generalization to chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Denition 3.2 (2p-bounded (T;k)-source adversary). Let A be a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithm that is given as input a pair (1;pk) and or-
acle access to RoR(mode;pk;) for some mode 2 freal;randg. Then, A is a 2p-
bounded (T;k)-source adversary if for every  2 N there exists a set X = X of
polynomial-time samplable (T;k)-sources such that:
1. jXj  2p.
2. For each of A's RoR queries M it holds that:
{ M 2 X.
{ For all (m1;:::;mT) in the support of M and for all distinct i;j 2 [T]
it holds that mi 6= mj.
In addition, A is a block-source adversary if X is a set of (T;k)-block-sources.
Denition 3.3 (Adaptive chosen-distribution attacks (ACD-CPA)). A
deterministic public-key encryption scheme  = (KeyGen;Enc;Dec) is (p;T;k)-
ACD-CPA-secure (resp. block-wise (p;T;k)-ACD-CPA-secure) if for any proba-
bilistic polynomial-time 2p-bounded (T;k)-source (resp. block-source) adversary
A, there exists a negligible function (k) such that
Adv
ACD-CPA
;A ()
def =


Pr
h
Expt
real
;A() = 1
i
  Pr
h
Expt
rand
;A() = 1
i

  ();
where for each mode 2 freal;randg and  2 N the experiment Expt
mode
;A () is
dened as follows:
1. (sk;pk)   KeyGen(1).
2. b   ARoR(mode;pk;)(1;pk).
3. Output b.
In addition, such a scheme is (p;T;k)-ACD1-CPA-secure (resp. block-wise (p;T;k)-
ACD1-CPA-secure) if the above holds for any probabilistic polynomial-time 2p-
bounded (T;k)-source (resp. block-source) adversary A that queries the RoR or-
acle at most once.
Our adaptive notion of security enables an immediate reduction of \multi-
shot" adversaries to \single-shot" ones, as in the case of randomized public-key
encryption. The following theorem follows via a standard hybrid argument.
Theorem 3.4 (Equivalence of ACD-CPA-security and ACD1-CPA-security).
For any p, T, and k, a deterministic public-key encryption scheme  is (p;T;k)-
ACD-CPA-secure (resp. block-wise (p;T;k)-ACD-CPA-secure) if and only if it
is (p;T;k)-ACD1-CPA-secure (resp. block-wise (p;T;k)-ACD1-CPA-secure).14 A. Raghunathan, G. Segev, S. Vadhan
4 Chosen-Plaintext Security based on Lossy Trapdoor
Functions
In this section we present our basic construction of a public-key deterministic
encryption scheme that is secure according to our notion of adaptive security.
We refer the reader to Section 1.3 for a high-level description of the scheme, and
of the main challenges and ideas underlying our approach. In what follows we
formally describe the scheme, discuss the parameters that we obtain using known
instantiations of its building blocks, and discuss the main ideas underlying its
proof of security.
The scheme DE. Let n = n(), ` = `(), t = t() and  = () be functions of
the security parameter  2 N. Let (Gen0;Gen1;F;F 1) be a collection of (n;`)-
lossy trapdoor functions, and for every  2 N let  be a t-wise -dependent
collection of permutations over f0;1gn. Our scheme DE = (KeyGen;Enc;Dec) is
dened as follows:
{ Key generation. The key-generation algorithm KeyGen on input 1 sam-
ples (;)   Gen1(1) and    . It then outputs pk = (;) and sk = .
{ Encryption. The encryption algorithm Enc on input a public key pk =
(;) and a message m 2 f0;1gn outputs c = F(;(m)).
{ Decryption. The decryption algorithm Dec on input a secret key sk = 
and a ciphertext c outputs m =  1  
F 1(;c)

.
Theorem 4.1. The scheme DE is block-wise (p;T;k)-ACD-CPA-secure for any
n = n(), ` = `(), p = p(), and T = T() by setting t = p + n   ` + logT +
!(log), k = n   ` + 2logT + 2logt + !(log), and  = 2 nt.
Parameters. Using existing constructions of lossy trapdoor functions (see Sec-
tion 2.3), for any n = n() and for any constant 0 <  < 1 we can instantiate our
scheme with ` = n   n. Therefore, for any n = n(), p = p(), and T = T(),
we obtain schemes with t = p + n + !(log), k = n + !(log), and  = 2 nt.
Proof overview. The proof of security consists of two steps. Let X be a set of
at most 2p plaintext distributions. First, the security of the collection of lossy
trapdoor functions allows us to replace the injective function f() = F(;) with
a lossy function e f() = F(~ ;). Next, we use the high-moment crooked leftover
hash lemma derived in Section ?? and show that with overwhelming probability
over the choice of the permutation , it holds that for every plaintext distribution
M 2 X, the two distributions e f((M)) and e f(U) are statistically close, even
given the public key (i.e., ~  and ). Therefore, essentially no information on the
plaintext is revealed { even when the specic choice of M 2 X may adaptively
depend on pk. A second application of the security of the collection of lossy
trapdoor functions allows us to switch back from the lossy function to an injective
one, which exactly reects the output of the real-or-random encryption oracle in
the rand mode. We refer the reader to the full version [?] for the formal proof.DPKE for Adaptively Chosen Plaintext Distributions 15
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